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SHRINKWRAP LICENSES: CONSEQUENCES
OF BREAKING THE SEAL
INTRODUCTION
In the last 50 years, computer software has evolved from
custom designed programs printed on punch cards for use with
huge, million-dollar mainframes into retail items available in the
mass market at affordable prices for individual consumers to use
with their personal computers.! The law, however, has played
tortoise to technology's hare-it remains to be seen whether legal
forms will develop to appropriately resolve the multitude of
problems posed by the advent of computer technology.' One such
problem is the status of shrinkwrap licenses.3
Shrinkwrap licensing represents an attempt by software
manufacturers to provide greater protection for their products
than currently afforded under pure copyright protection.4 Pur-
1 See Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The Legality of the Form License
Agreement, 48 LA. L. REV. 87, 87 (1987) ("Software for ... personal computers is
commonly mass marketed."); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer Software as a
Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the Intangibility
Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129, 129 (1985) (noting tremendous increase in use of per-
sonal computers due to more sophisticated and less expensive computer software).
2 See Horovitz, supra note 1, at 129 (recognizing vast amount of computer-
related litigation resulting from legal problems with computer programs).
'Shrinkwrap licenses derived their name from the transparent plastic wrap-
ping commonly used to wrap computer disks. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1241 n.6 (1995). Al-
though it is not certain when shrinkwrap licenses were first developed, "they were a
feature of the licensing landscape by the early 1980's." Id. at 1241 n.5. Shrinkwrap
licenses are also known as " 'tear-open,' 'tear-me-open,' 'box-top,' and 'blister-pack'
licenses." David Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tear-Me-Open" Software License
Agreements, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 509, 509 (1985). The on-line vari-
ant of the shrinkwrap is known as the "web-wrap." These are license agreements
that appear before a user is given access to a particular web site and usually define
the terms under which access to the web site is granted. See generally Stephen J.
Davidson & Michael J. Wurzer, Shrink-Wrap Licenses: The Continuing Controversy,
453 PL/PAT. 673, 676-92 (1996); Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On-Line Soft-
ware Distribution: New Life for Shrinkwrap Licenses?, 13 No. 4 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 8
(1996).
4 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of
Mass Market Software License Agreements, RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335,
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chasers of mass produced software encounter shrinkwrap li-
censes as the list of fine print terms expressed in complicated le-
galese which the user is expected to read (though more likely
will ignore) prior to using the product.' Often, the terms are
printed on an envelope within the actual purchased package
which contains the software diskettes.6 The user may construc-
tively assent to these terms by opening the flap of the envelope.7
Another way a purchaser can consent to the licensing terms is by
breaking a plastic seal which tightly fits the software package,
336 (1996) (discussing how end user license agreements as "EULA's and shrink-
wrap licenses afford greater protection for software manufacturers); Kemp, supra
note 1, at 90-94 (noting that software manufacturers are trying to protect their pro-
prietary rights in their computer programs); Lemley, supra note 3, at 1239
(recognizing software vendors' attempts, through license provisions, to "compel their
customers to adhere to more restrictive provisions than copyright ... law would re-
quire").
5 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1241 (explaining that theoretically purchasers
will read license terms before using software); see also Kemp, supra note 1, at 91
(detailing simplicity of copying computer programs stored on floppy disks and not-
ing that there is no accurate method to determine how much software is illegally
copied for personal use). A typical term of a shrinkwrap license is one that limits the
warranties of the software in an attempt to avoid liability for incidental or conse-
quential damages. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1245; see also Step-Saver Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that warranty dis-
claimer could not be incorporated into parties agreement). Some shrinkwrap li-
censes even attempt to limit software users' rights that would otherwise be permit-
ted under copyright law. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1246-47. Generally these are
the types of provisions that raise questions of preemption and, therefore, may be
unenforceable. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th
Cir. 1988) (invalidating statute which upheld validity of software licenses, as di-
rectly preempted by section 117 of Copyright Act).
6 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at 339-40. When a computer
manufacturer has pre-loaded software onto a computer, acceptance of the license
agreement is often expressed by conforming to conduct as indicated in text dis-
played on the computer next to the power switch. The text usually states that "by
turning on the machine you assent to the terms of the license agreement." Id. at 340
(discussing license acceptance when software is pre-loaded on computer). Other
manufacturers place the same type of notice on the computer's power cords. See id.
at 330-41 (suggesting that plugging in power cord and booting up computer consti-
tute acceptance of license).
7 See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 257 n.2. The license agreement in Vault Corp.
was as follows:
[Vendor] is providing the enclosed materials to you on the express condi-
tion that you assent to this software license. By using any of the enclosed
diskette(s), you agree to the following provisions. If you do not agree with
the license provisions, return these materials to your dealer, in original
packaging within 3 days from receipt, for a refund.
Id. In contract terms, such a proposed agreement constitutes a "reverse unilateral
contract." JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 2-10 (3d ed.
1987).
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hence the name "shrinkwrap."8
Courts have generally refused to recognize the terms of
these licenses because the terms were not reviewable by the pur-
chaser until after the price of the item had been paid, and there-
fore the terms were not part of the bargained-for exchange.9
Some courts have also invoked the Federal Copyright Act to pre-
empt state enforcement of some shrinkwrap contract terms.'0
Moreover, shrinkwraps have been held unenforceable as con-
tracts of adhesion because very often users have no notice of the
existence of the license, or of the fact that their conduct mani-
fests assent to its terms." The sole exception to this general rule
of non-enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses is the case of ProCD
v. Zeidenberg.2 In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit enforced a
shrinkwrap license, 3 creating a split in the circuits with regard
to the enforceability of shrinkwraps.'
In an attempt to reconcile the law of shrinkwraps specifi-
cally, and to promulgate a set of rules governing commerce of in-
tangible goods generally, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is currently drafting a
supplement to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 This
supplement, entitled Article 2B-Licenses, aims to consolidate the
law of shrinkwraps, and although not yet complete, is expected
to be given to the states for ratification in late 1997. Thus, at
" See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1241 (discussing origin of term "shrinkwrap"); see
also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
ProCD] (noting that vendors of software prefer term "end user" license instead of
"shrinkwrap" license).
9 See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104 (finding that license terms were not part of
bargained for agreement); see also Moore & Hadden, supra note 3, at 3-4
(sugiesting ways to resolve absence of bargaining).
I See Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 269-70 (finding Louisiana's License Act pre-
empted by federal law).
"See id. (upholding district court's finding that license agreement was contract
of adhesion); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Super-
highway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1466, 1472 n.23 (1995) (defining shrinkwrap license as contract of adhesion).
'2 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
13 See id. (reversing district court's decision that federal law prohibits enforce-
ment of shrinkwrap licenses).
" Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447 (upholding shrinkwraps as enforceable con-
tracts by Seventh Circuit), with Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104 (invalidating of shrink-
wrap terms by Third Circuit).
5 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2B
LICENSES, 3 (Draft May 1997) [hereinafter DRAFT] (discussing purpose of Article 2
Supplement).
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present, given the divergent case law and the unfinished status
of the draft proposal, the law with regard to shrinkwraps is un-
clear. 16
This Note will discuss the development of case law concern-
ing shrinkwraps, the rationales of the various courts deciding
the issues, and the questions left unresolved by the judiciary.
Next, this Note will focus on the portion of proposed Article 2B
which attempts to provide a uniform test for the enforceability of
shrinkwraps. Finally, this Note will point out the merits and
shortcomings of the "2B" approach. Specifically, this Note will
assert that, notwithstanding some minor improvements which
could be articulated with respect to the definition of certain
terms, proposed Article 2B provides a competent framework for
analyzing the legal effect of shrinkwrap licenses.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CRITIQUE OF SHRiNKWRAP LICENSING
LAW
A. Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology:
Unenforceability of Shrinkwrap Licenses
The question of enforceability of a shrinkwrap license first"
came before the judiciary in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology.18 Step-Saver Data Systems ("Step-Saver") was
a value-added retailer of computer software and hardware sys-
tems. 9 The company marketed a multi-user computer network
comprised of a central computer, provided by defendant Wyse
Technology, and several terminals linked through an operating
system, provided by another defendant, The Software Link
'6 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (demonstrating existing division
among circuit courts concerning enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses).
17 While other cases dealing with software licensing preceded Step-Saver, see,
e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988), the
Step-Saver court was the first to actually rule on the enforceability of a shrinkwrap
software license. In Vault Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana statute
permitting the enforcement of software license agreements was preempted by fed-
eral copyright law. Id. at 270. Therefore, the court found that any licenses granted
pursuant to the Louisiana law were unenforceable because they interfered with the
copyright privileges granted to consumers by federal law. See id. The court, how-
ever, was not called upon to decide the enforceability of the actual license agree-
ment. See id. at 255.
18 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
'9 Specifically, Step-Saver sold systems for use in the offices of doctors and law-
yers. See id. at 93.
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("TSL").2  When Step-Saver began to receive complaints about
its systems from its consumers, it sought assistance from the
manufacturers of the hardware and software components of its
systems.2 Unable to resolve the dispute amicably, Step-Saver
brought suit against the manufacturers, alleging breach of war-
ranty and intentional misrepresentation.' TSL defended by
claiming that the license agreement printed on the box-top of its
software constituted the entire agreement between itself and
Step-Saver.' This license agreement disclaimed all product war-
ranties by TSL.'
The central issue before the Step-Saver court was the effect
of the box-top license.2 The court, after initially noting that its
analysis would be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code
(,U.C.C."),26 held that the warranty disclaimers and remedy limi-
2' See id. at 93-94.2' See id. at 94.
2 See id.
See id.
24 See id. at 94-95.
' Id. at 95-106 (discussing effect of box-top licenses).
"6 See id. at 98. All of the parties to the suit agreed that the products sold con-
stituted goods. See id. at 94 n.6. This is ironic since the primary reason for develop-
ing software licenses was to circumvent the effect of the first sale doctrine of copy-
right law. According to the first sale doctrine, once the copyright holder sells a copy
of the copyrighted work to a third party, that third party may then sell or otherwise
dispose of the copy without the copyright holder's consent. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a)
(West 1977) ("[Tihe owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made ... or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy ... ."); see also
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1908) (explaining first sale doc-
trine). Thus, without a shrinkwrap license, purchasers of software could buy a copy
of a computer program, and then lease or lend it to another without violating any
copyright on the program. Since copying software is relatively easy, software pro-
ducers were concerned that companies would form specifically to purchase copies of
programs and lease them to consumers. Consumers could, instead of purchasing
their own copy of the program, simply lease a copy of the program, and copy it. See
Kemp, supra note 1, at 92-93 (detailing problems associated with software rental).
This copying by the individual consumers would presumably infringe the copyright,
but it would be impractical for the copyright holder to identify and sue each individ-
ual copier. See id. at 92 (stressing difficulty in enforcing copyright laws against in-
dividuals). Therefore, it would be in the software producers' best interest to sue the
companies that were distributing the copies of the program to individual consumers,
rather than the consumers themselves. The first sale doctrine, however, stands as a
bar to successful suit against these software "rental" companies. By characterizing
the original transaction between the software producer and the software company
as a license instead of a sale, and by making the license personal and
non-transferable, software producers hoped to avoid the reach of the first sale doc-
trine. See David L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing
1997]
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tations on the licensing agreement had not become part of the
parties' agreement.27  In resolving the dispute, the court used
section 2-20728 of the U.C.C. in its analysis. Applying section 2-
207, the court first concluded that the behavior of the parties
indicated the existence of a contract.2' Thus, as the court stated,
"th[is] dispute is ... not over the existence of a contract, but the
nature of its terms," and therefore the court applied section 2-
207 to determine the terms of the contract."° The court held that
the additional terms on the box-top were unenforceable for sev-
eral reasons. First, the contract was sufficiently definite without
Problem, 9 COMPUTER LAw. 1, 1 (1992) (noting that computer companies elect to li-
cense, rather than sell, computer programs in attempt to avoid first sale doctrine).
Questions remain, however, as to whether the use of such practices to circumvent
the first sale doctrine would be statutorily preempted by the Federal Copyright Act
or constitutionally preempted by the exclusive constitutional grant of authority over
copyright issues to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (vesting
Congress with power "tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries"); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (discussing preemption doctrine with respect to pat-
ent law). The irony is manifest in the fact that the transaction is called a license in
order to avoid the effect of the first sale doctrine, but the licensor of this fictional
'non-sale" transaction looks for relief to the U.C.C., which specifically governs sales.
27 See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105.
28 See id. at 98-100. Section 2-207 of the U.C.C. provides:
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an ac-
ceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms
of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection
to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (West 1996).
29 See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98. It is important to note that the finding of a
contract was not based on the box-top license agreement, but rather on the conduct
between the parties. See id.
20 Id. at 98; see McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 488 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding that where parties' behavior indicates existence of contract, section 2-
207 governs its terms).
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regard to the terms of the box-top license.3' Second, the addi-
tional terms did not become part of the agreement because the
integration clause and the "consent by opening" language in the
beginning of the licensing agreement did not expressly state that
the seller would be unwilling to proceed absent the buyer's ac-
ceptance of the additional terms.32
The Step-Saver court also rejected the contention that the
box-top license was enforceable because it manifested a course of
dealing between the parties." Finally, the court was not per-
suaded by a public policy argument that "requiring software
companies to stand behind representations concerning their
products will inevitably destroy the software industry."' Rather,
the court noted that the timing of the presentation of disclaimers
to a purchaser was a relevant factor in determining the dis-
claimer's enforceability.3 5 The court further noted that the dis-
31 See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 100. U.C.C. section 2-204(3) provides that "[e]ven
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefi-
niteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (West 1996). The
court found that the essential terms (i.e. the goods involved, quantity, and price)
were dealt with in the course of negotiations between the parties. See Step-Saver,
939 F.2d at 100. Thus, by definition, the terms in the box-top license were not es-
sential to the contract. See id. The Step-Saver court also rejected the defendant's
(TSL) argument that the nature of the transaction, sale, or license and the warran-
ties available were only mentioned in the box-top license. Id.
32 See id. at 103. The test adopted by the court to determine whether a writing
constitutes conditional acceptance was whether such a writing requires the seller
"to demonstrate an unwillingness to proceed with the transaction unless the addi-
tional ... terms are included in the contract." Id. at 102. The court found that the
integration clause and "consent by opening language w[ere] insufficient to constitute
a conditional acceptance." Id.
Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 103. U.C.C. section 1-205(1) defines course of dealing
as "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction
which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for
interpreting their expressions and other conduct." U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (West 1996).
The court found that there was no course of dealing because repeated offers of a
term without an expressed acceptance did not constitute acceptance of an additional
term. See id. at 104. Thus, by sending Step-Saver several boxes of software with the
licensing agreement included, TSL did no more than request that the terms be in-
cluded. See id. Since there was never an acceptance on the part of Step-Saver, the
terms were never included. See id. The court held that "the actions of TSL in re-
peatedly sending a writing, whose terms would otherwise be excluded under U.C.C.
§ 2-207, cannot establish a course of conduct between TSL and Step-Saver that
adopted the terms of the writing." Id.
34 Id. at 104.
' See id. at 104-05. The Step Saver court stated that:
When a disclaimer is not expressed until after the contract is formed,
U.C.C. § 2-207 governs the interpretation of the contract, and, between
1997]
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claimer provision constituted a material alteration of the parties'
agreement because it reallocated risk and, therefore, could not
become part of the contract unless both parties had manifested
assent to its incorporation.3 6
The decision in Step-Saver represents the initial hesitancy of
courts to grant acceptance of shrinkwrap licenses. However, the
Step-Saver court's decision did not address enforceability of
shrinkwraps in general, it only addressed whether the terms
were enforceable as part of an overreaching sale agreement be-
tween the parties.37 In Step-Saver, the parties conducted their
transactions face-to-face and had ample opportunity to discuss
the terms of their agreement. Thus, the court did not need to
decide whether a shrinkwrap license per se would be enforceable
if it had constituted the only expression of agreement between
the parties, and if the purchaser had no opportunity to negotiate
the terms of the sale/license.
The holding of Step-Saver, therefore, offers little help when
applied to licenses for mass produced software which impose
standard terms, identical to every consumer, to be accepted by
the consumer without the opportunity to negotiate.
As the software market changed from one of custom de-
signed software for commercial use to one of mass marketed
software sold in retail stores, the question of the enforceability of
shrinkwraps as the sole expression of an agreement between the
parties came to the forefront. It was left to the court in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg8 to decide this issue.
B. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Shrinkwraps Enforced
In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit directly addressed the status
of shrinkwrap licenses. Specifically, the court held such licenses
to be enforceable as long as they did not violate generally ac-
cepted principles of contract law and were not preempted by ex-
isting Federal Copyright Law.39
In ProCD, a manufacturer of computer software ("ProCD,
merchants, such disclaimers, to the extent they materially alter the par-
ties' agreement, are not incorporated into the parties' agreement.
Id. at 105.
16 See id.
17 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (noting that Step Saver touched on enforceability
of shrinkwrap licenses but did not address issue fully).
38 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
39 See id. at 1457.
[Vol. 71:839
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Inc."), compiled a phone book database at considerable expense"
and developed a search engine to be used in conjunction with the
database.4 In order to effectively market the software, ProCD,
Inc. engaged in price discrimination.42 This practice involved i-
censing the software to commercial users at higher prices than
those prices offered to private users.' ProCD, Inc. could justify
price discrimination because a commercial user would derive
greater utility from the software by using it as a potential mail-
ing or marketing list and, therefore, would pay more than a pri-
vate individual whose use would be limited to personal interest."
A problem arose, however, when Zeidenberg, a private user who
paid a lower price for a limited use version of the software, made
the database commercially available over the Internet through
his own proprietary search engine.45
ProCD, Inc. sued Zeidenberg in district court seeking an in-
junction against all activities proscribed within the shrinkwrap
license packaged with the software." The shrinkwrap license
was printed on the actual CD-ROM, the instruction manual, and
appeared on the screen every time the program ran.47 Addi-
tionally, the license provided that if the user did not consent to
its terms the user could return the software for a full refund.
The district court denied the injunction finding that the terms of
the shrinkwrap were unenforceable because they were pre-
empted by Federal Copyright Law,48 and that there was no clear
manifestation of assent upon which to enforce the terms at is-
sue.49 From this denial, ProCD, Inc. appealed.





45 See id. at 1450.
46 See id.
41 See id.
48 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 659 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter ProCD, Inc.]; see 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (providing
for preemption of state laws which attempt to provide protection similar to Federal
Copyright Law); see also Thomas Lee Hazon, Contract Principles as a Guide for Pro-
tecting Intellectual Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright
Protection, The Evolving Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Li-
censing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 129 (1986) (explaining that
"[c]ourts should invalidate contracts attempting to expand the intellectual prop-
erty's protection too far beyond the parameters of copyright law on the grounds of
statutory preemption, or as against public policy").
4" See ProCD, Inc., 908 F. Supp. at 655.
1997]
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the terms
were not preempted by Federal Copyright Law, and that
shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable so long as they do
not violate established principles of contract law.5" In reaching
its conclusion, the ProCD court discussed the dynamics of the
software market and the need to preserve the feasibility of
shrinkwrap licenses, so that mass market software ventures
could be feasible.5' The court then turned to the U.C.C. to re-
solve the remaining issues.
1. The ProCD Court's Treatment of Contract Issues
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's view
that the U.C.C. "cannot countenance the sequence of money now,
terms later."52 Instead, the ProCD court likened the nature of
this transaction to that of other cases in which the specific terms
of the bargain were not disclosed until after the sale.5" In these
instances, manufacturers choose not to put all of the contract
terms on the outside of the package where other information,
'0 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
" Specifically, the court discussed the price discrimination schemes and their
benefit to consumers. The benefit of such schemes is that they give private users the
ability to use powerful software at a reduced cost. According to the court, to com-
pensate for the negligible amount of revenue derived from licensing to private users,
software developers license similar versions of their software to commercial users at
greatly inflated prices. See id. at 1449-50. If a private user used the software com-
mercially, such use would cause significant economic harm in the form of lost po-
tential revenue to the software developer. See id. at 1449. This, in turn, would cre-
ate either a disincentive to sell to private individuals or an incentive to sell to
private individuals at a higher price in order to recover the costs of abuse of the li-
censing agreement. In addition, the court noted that the use of standardized
shrinkwrap licenses permits an efficient means of mass production and distribution
of the product without having to face the near impossible task of re-negotiating each
individual transaction. See id. at 1450.
52 Id. at 1452. This view was also adopted by the drafters of Article 2B
(discussed infra in section II-C). Generally Article 2B does not require that a con-
sumer have notice of a term before paying for a product, but rather upholds the va-
lidity of licenses that give notice before commencing use of the product, or at some
reasonable time thereafter. See U.C.C. § 2B-308(a) (proposed official draft 1997).
The only time notice must be given prior to assent is if the term is a refusal term
(i.e. a term that the vendor knows would cause a consumer to refuse to go forward
with the transaction). See id. § 2B-308(b). If the term is a refusal term, it must be
"clearly disclosed" prior to the consumer's assent to the license. See id. § 2B-308(c).
For further discussion of section 2B-308(c), see infra Part II-C.
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MAV
Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995)) (regarding bills of lading); Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (concerning sale of cruise tickets over phone by
travel agent).
SHRINKWRAP LICENSES
germane to the transaction and of greater value to the consumer,
could be placed.54 The ProCD court agreed that to do otherwise
would require that certain terms, not of immediate interest to
the average consumer, take up most of the space on the pack-
age.
55
The ProCD court treated the software license as a standard-
ized contract,"6 and it rationalized this characterization on the
basis that the use of shrinkwrap licenses is fast becoming an ac-
cepted means of doing business of benefit to both buyers and
sellers of mass produced software.57
The ProCD court applied general contract principles and the
U.C.C. to find that the license terms were enforceable. Specifi-
cally, U.C.C. section 2-204(1) was invoked to support the conten-
tion that "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any man-
ner sufficient to show agreement."" Therefore, the ProCD court
maintained that "[a] vendor, as master of the offer, may invite
acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitation on the kind of
conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by per-
forming the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance."59
In ProCD, the vendor defined acceptance as the opening and use
of the product." By so doing, the purchaser would be deemed to
have accepted the terms of the license.6' Consequently, the court
held that the shrinkwrap licenses contained in the software
package were enforceable unless the terms were otherwise ob-
jectionable on general contract principles."
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
See id. (citing descriptions of system requirements, potential incompatibili-
ties, standard warranty, and license information as examples of such terms).Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)
("Standardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as standardiza-
tion of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass production and
distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transac-
tions rather than to details of individual transactions."); see also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 310 (2d ed. 1990) (noting
that "routine transactions" consist of standard forms that leave little room for nego-
tiation between buyer and seller).
67 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52 (explaining that to do otherwise "would drive
prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horse-and-buggy age");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 56, at 311 (stating that advantages of standardization to
both parties include reduced costs).




2See id. at 1454-55.
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By so doing, the ProCD court granted shrinkwrap licenses a
broad acceptance similar to that of other contracts, radically re-
defining their effect in the marketplace.63
While this holding is an important first step in providing
certainty in the mass software market, the ProCD court failed to
follow through and articulate a sound policy in analyzing
shrinkwrap licenses.
It is submitted that the ProCD court erred in three signifi-
cant respects: (a) it failed to articulate a notice requirement as a
prerequisite to enforceability; (b) it failed to take into account
the intangible nature of the subject matter involved; and (c) it
may have unduly given too much control to the software manu-
facturer by characterizing the vendor as "the master of the offer."
(a) The Notice Element
Notice is an important requirement that is taken for granted
in the ProCD decision. For example, applying the ProCD ra-
tionale as it stands, a licensor may insert unreasonable limita-
tions into a shrinkwrap, and define the means of assent and
user's remedies without any requirement that the consumer
have knowledge of how these limitations affect their right to use
the software. Without explicit notice of terms that the reason-
able consumer would regard as material or even of the existence
of the shrinkwrap license, a consumer may be bound to terms
contrary to the consumer's reasonable expectations. Such a
situation violates basic principles of contract law.' Further-
more, if vendors are not required to give notice of the existence of
a license, they are likely to abuse their position since no disin-
centive exists to guard against the use of unreasonable terms.
Vendors will maximize their own protection at the expense of the
consumer's ability to enter freely into a contract.
If notice is required, however, vendors will be sure to inform
consumers of the existence of the license and of its terms. Fail-
ure to do so would frustrate the vendors' purpose of protecting
their intellectual property rights or even render the contract un-
enforceable. Furthermore, vendors will be less likely to include
"See id. at 1450.
"See FARNSWORTH, supra note 56, at 314-17 (explaining that requested terms
without notice are not enforced because although they are part of offer they are not
understood by offeree to be so). But see id. at 148 (stating that accepting offeree
cannot escape liability by claiming lack of intention to be bound).
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objectionable terms into their licenses, since consumers would
have an opportunity to see the terms, and objectionable terms
would impair the product's marketability. Thus, it follows that
some form of notice requirement should be an important factor
in a court's consideration of the enforceability of a shrinkwrap
licensing scheme.
An argument that could be made in favor of the ProCD
court's position of ignoring notice is that shrinkwraps are en-
forceable only to the extent they do not conflict with well-settled
contract principles. Thus, if a term would be considered uncon-
scionable in an ordinary contract, it would similarly be so in a
shrinkwrap. According to this reasoning, whether the consumer
has notice of the unconscionable term or not would be irrelevant,
because the term would never be part of the contract. This ar-
gument, however, is flawed because it assumes that existing con-
tract law can be applied with equal force to both tangible and in-
tangible goods, and because it ignores the market dynamics of
mass produced software.
(b) Software as an Intangible Good
Computer software is an intangible good which by its nature
has properties strikingly different from those of a tangible good,
such as a tractor. For example, intangible goods can exist in
several places at the same time, and can be easily copied and
disseminated without degrading the original. These qualities
require rules distinct from those which govern tangible items.
While the rules pertaining to intangibles may be similar to the
rules governing non-tangible goods related transactions, they do
not necessarily have to be so. For example, the particular ability
of computer technology to provide mechanisms for enforcing li-
censing terms could allow new legal standards to be developed.
These standards could reflect the specific and different nature of
the contract which exists in the context of this new technology.'
' An illustration would be if a software distributor included a term in a license
which placed a time restriction on the use of the software and provided that the li-
censor may utilize any remedy to enforce the terms of the license. The developer
may then insert an executable program which, upon checking the date and finding
that the allotted time has expired, executes itself and erases the licensed software
from the end-user's computer. Such a provision could almost certainly lead to abuse
through overzealous self-help on the part pf the licensor, yet to date there has been
no judicial guidance as to whether such a term would be enforceable or not. But see
U.C.C. §§ 2B-320 & 2B-620 (proposed official draft 1997) (allowing such electronic
controls provided notice requirements are met). The analogy to such an action in a
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For example, in the area of unconscionability there is a well de-
veloped body of law with regard to the kinds of terms that are
unconscionable in a standard contract transaction.66 In compari-
son, the law is a vacuum with regard to what kinds of terms are
unconscionable in a computer context.6 ' Had the ProCD court
addressed the issue of reasonable terms in a computer context,
and not on general contract principles, its decision would have
provided a more solid foundation to this new area of law.
(c) The Vendor as Master of the Offer
The ProCD court disregarded the fact that, in comparison to
standard contracts, shrinkwrap licensing transactions are sub-
ject to an imbalance in bargaining power at contract formation.
In a standard face-to-face transaction, the parties have the op-
portunity to negotiate terms in accordance with their expecta-
tions. However, in a shrinkwrap situation where most software
is sold over-the-counter as a retail item, the purchaser has no
contact at all with the software developer and therefore cannot
negotiate terms. This disparity in bargaining power with respect
to the opportunity to negotiate terms with the maker of the offer
allows a software developer to include unreasonable, though not
necessarily unconscionable terms which may frustrate the expec-
tations of the end user. Consequently, the lack of opportunity to
negotiate compounded with the lack of a notice requirement in-
vites gross abuse of the shrinkwrap licensing system by the de-
non-computer context would be to allow a licensor of a tractor, for example, to insert
a time-bomb within the tractor in order to assure itself that the tractor is not used
beyond the time allowed under the license. Surely this kind of term and action un-
dertaken pursuant to it may so shock the conscience of the court as to be considered
unenforceable. Thus, the validity of analogous actions depends on the context in
which each action was undertaken.
" See U.C.C. § 2-302 (West 1996) (recognizing doctrine of unconscionability and
providing courts with way to police against unconscionable terms). The U.C.C., how-
ever, does not define the term unconscionability, and provides only limited guidance
as to the term's meaning. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 56, at 327. Case law has
provided the following definition: "Unconscionability has generally been recognized
to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
67 Aside from the possible procedural unconscionability of shrinkwrap licenses
caused by the disparate bargaining power between the end-user and the consumer,
there may be terms which are substantively unconscionable. In ProCD, neither
party claimed that the terms of the license were unconscionable. ProCD, 86 F.3d at




veloper. These dynamics require that shrinkwraps be treated
differently than other kinds of contracts.
2. ProCD's Treatment of Preemption
A second issue before the ProCD court was whether the term
of the agreement limiting the database to non-commercial uses
was preempted by federal copyright law.68 The district court
held that even if state law should treat shrinkwrap licenses as
valid contracts, certain terms of a contract would be preempted
from state enforcement by the Federal Copyright Act.6 9 On ap-
peal, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's pre-
emption analysis, and instead agreed with sister circuits7" in
finding that the rights created by the contract terms were not
equivalent to those under copyright law because "a simple two-
party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright."' 7'
The ProCD court based its conclusion on its understanding
that since contracts only affect their parties, contracts do not
cs Id. at 1447, 1453-55.
c9 See id. at 1447-48. The district court in ProCD, though finding the contract
term to be preempted, failed to adopt a sound rationale distinguishing the relevant
aspects of the case at bar from cases in which the contract terms at issue were not
preempted. ProCD, Inc., 908 F. Supp. at 655. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act
prevents state enforcement of
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
7o The ProCD court noted first that several sister circuit court decisions sup-
ported the notion that rights created by contract are not equivalent and that "courts
usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected." ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1454. The ProCD court drew its authority from three cases: National Car
Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th
Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990); and
Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
7' ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. The ProCD court thought the activity to be different
in kind because third party rights were not affected, and stated that "[clontracts ...
generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do
not create 'exclusive rights.' Someone who found a copy ... on the street would not
be affected by the shrinkwrap license." Id. at 1454. Thus the ProCD court considers
these third party finders to be the only foreseeably affected third parties. This ra-
tionale is flawed considering the act's far reach over all parties as well as the broad
scope of the shrinkwrap license. Conceivably, the license would affect any third
party attempting to use the software because, according to the license, by using the
software one agrees to its terms. Thus, the reality is that the transaction is not as
limited as the ProCD court concedes.
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create "exclusive rights."72 The ProCD court cited several in-
stances in which contracts would not be preempted even though
they touched upon the exclusive rights created by copyright
law.73 For example, the court noted that trade secrets may be
state enforced without being preempted by federal statute.74 As
another example, the ProCD court noted that state laws may en-
force contracts which require an individual to return a tape of a
copyright protected film from a video rental store.75 In its
analysis, the ProCD court limited the scope of the copyright pro-
tection section of the Copyright Act. The court found the scope of
copyright preemption to be similar to preemption clauses present
in statutes such as the federal regulations of air carriers, which
prevent states from substituting their own regulatory systems
for those of the federal government.6
Although the ProCD court properly enforced the agreement,
its treatment of preemption is wholly inadequate for providing
the needed precedent on how to apply the preemption doctrine to
shrinkwrap licenses, and it is an indication of the dangers of in-
cluding certain terms in shrinkwrap agreements.77 The Federal
72 Id. at 1454. However, the ProCD court stated that "we think it prudent to re-
frain from adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is necessarily out-
side the preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to
foresee." Id. at 1455.
See id. at 1454-55.
7' See id. at 1454, The ProCD court cited Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974), for the proposition that contracts involving trade secrets may be
enforced because "they do not affect strangers' ability to discover and use the infor-
mation independently." Id. The court went on to explain that if the 1976 amend-
ments to section 301(a) of the Federal Copyright Act overruled Kewanee, making
such contracts unenforceable, then "no one has noticed." Id.
75 See id. at 1454.
7' See id. The Federal regulation on air carriers states that "a State ... may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 417-18(b)(1)
(1997). Although the Constitution does not prohibit states from protecting intellec-
tual property rights, state laws are preempted when Congress enacts explicit regu-
lations intended to govern that particular aspect of commerce in its entirety. ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1455; see also Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672,
683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that HBO's New York State unfair competition
claim was preempted by section 301(a) because it involved rights specifically pro-
tected by Federal Copyright Act).
It is the potential of shrinkwrap licenses to modify rights to intellectual prop-
erty based on a state contractual claim that may bring state enforcement of a con-
tract term into conflict with the federal scheme and thus trigger preemption. See
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding Louisiana
statute which prohibited 'reverse-engineering' directly conflicted with Copyright Act
and, therefore, was preempted); see also Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon, Atten-
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Copyright Act preempts any state law claims which arise from
an attempt to enforce rights "equivalent" to copyright protec-
tion.78 For example, state laws that attempt to grant exclusive
rights to information already within the public domain would
conflict with the purposes of the federal scheme, and would
therefore be preempted.79
Rather than engage in a thorough preemption analysis con-
sidering the general enforcement of such adhesion contracts
upon the aggregate market, the ProCD court considered only the
industry viewpoint and ultimately justified limiting users' rights
because it believed price discrimination to be beneficial to the
software industry.80 While the commercial viability of shrink-
wrap licenses is an important factor, this commercial concern is
insufficient to supplant furnishing a legal mechanism through
tion Software Developers: Beware of Shrinkwrap Licenses, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 5, 1994, at
55 (discussing whether Vault decision will hamper statutory efforts to enforce
shrinkwrap licenses). On opposing sides of the enforceability issue are the state pro-
tected rights of the individual to contract and the constitutionally granted power of
the federal government to promote innovation. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8
(providing Congress with power to "[piromote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries").
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (defining scope of preemption by providing that "all
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by" Federal Copyright Law).
7 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989). The purpose of copyright protection is not to safeguard any "natural rights of
the author, but to promote free expression." See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1909). The copyright clause of the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to provide for protection to promote a specific purpose. This public policy was
explained in Mazer v. Stein, which stated:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrifi-
cial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensu-
rate with the services rendered.
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953); see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Be-
tween Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45
DUKE L.J. 479, 483-84 n.15 (1995) (discussing historical basis of copyright clause as
primarily concerned with creating financial incentives for inventors).
Federal law may preempt a state statute if the "state law stands 'as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.'" California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449-50 ("To make price discrimination work, ... the seller
must be able to control arbitrage.").
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which to deal with preemption issues.8'
Therefore, when considering the validity of shrinkwrap li-
censes, the courts should contemplate the effect of enforcing a
particular term upon the entire market. In so doing, the courts
should distinguish the type of subject matter to be protected in
conjunction with the manner in which assent of the consumer is
sought. Thus, by examining the substance of the agreement, a
court may determine whether the lack of true assent, coupled
with pervasive marketing of the product, attempts to create
rights equivalent to the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright. For example, terms which authorize limited use of
federally granted rights are properly enforceable under state
laws and may be enforceable within a shrinkwrap license as-
sented to after purchase."' However, those terms which attempt
to limit use of public domain subject matter or subject matter not
protected by copyright must be explicitly assented to at the time
of purchase.8 By simply viewing the relationship as a contract
between two parties, the ProCD court did not consider within its
preemption analysis the effect of certain terms upon the inter-
ests of third parties and other indirect,' yet inherent social
CoStS.
85
II. ARTICLE 2B: AN ATTEMPT AT CONSOLIDATION
In an effort to meet the demands of today's information
based economy, the NCCUSL created a proposed amendment to
the U.C.C. Article 2-Sales. This Article is entitled Article 2B-
Licenses.8 The premise of Article 2B is that an information
based economy requires different rules to govern commercial
transactions than the tangible product based economy prevalent
8' Central to the Seventh Circuit's holding in ProCD is that the work at issue, a
phone list database, required a substantial initial investment by ProCD Inc. to
comgile: it cost more than $10 million. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
See National Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.
1993).
' See supra note 71.
Id. But see James A. Eidelman & Carol R. Shepherd, Living Among Pirates:
Practical Strategies to Protect Computer Software, 65 MICH. B.J. 284 (1986)
(supporting use of shrinkwrap licenses); Kemp, supra note 1, at 111 (same).
The public derives certain benefits from the protection of creative works. To
view shrinkwrap licenses solely as contracts would be to ignore a federally created
statutorily supported distinction. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.




when Article 2 was promulgated 7  The need for a new set of
guidelines was justified by the special character of information
based transactions," and their growing share of the gross na-
tional product. 9 Article 2B proposes solutions to many of the
new issues arising from electronic commerce,9" but one of its
primary concerns is the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses.
Under Article 2B, shrinkwraps are called mass market li-
censes,9' and their enforceability is covered by section 2B-308.92
See id. at 3-4 (preface to Article 2B Part 1).
"3 See id. Because of the intangible nature of the product exchanged in informa-
tion transactions, and the characteristic withholding of rights to certain uses of in-
tangible products, the information industry evolved a different class of transactions
to govern information transfer: the License. See id. at 5. A license is defined by sec-
tion 2B-102(21) as:
[a] contract for transfer of rights in information which expressly condi-
tions, withholds or limits the rights, whether or not the contract transfers
title to a copy of the information. The term includes an access contract,
data processing contract, and software contract. The term does not include
a software contract that transfers ownership of the intellectual property
rights in the software or the reservation or creation of a security interest in
information.
Proposed Draft, supra note 86, at 43-44.0 "Software and related information technologies currently account for in ex-
cess of 4% of the gross national product." Id. at 5 (commentary to Article 2B).
9' See id. § 2B-103 (defining how scope of Article 2B extends to licenses existing
at time contract is formed, expected to come into being, or are to be discovered).
0' See Proposed Draft, supra note 86, at 23 (preface, lines 19-49).
92 Section 2B-308 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and Section 2B-309, a
party adopts the terms of a mass-market license if the party agrees, includ-
ing by manifesting assent, to the mass-market license before or in connec-
tion with the initial performance, use or access to the information.
(b) Terms adopted under subsection (a) include all of the terms of the li-
cense without regard to the knowledge or understanding of individual
terms by the party assenting to the form. However, except as otherwise
provided in this section, a term does not become part of the contract if the
term creates an obligation or imposes a limitation that:
(1) the party proposing the form should know would cause an ordinary
reasonable person acquiring this type of information in the mass mar-
ket to refuse the license if that party knew that the license contained
the particular term; or
(2) conflicts with the negotiated terms of agreement.
(c) A term described under subsection (b) is part of the contract if the party
that did not prepare the form manifests assent to the term.
(d) Subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a term that:
states a limit on the licensee's use of the information that would exist
under intellectual property law in the absence of the contractual term;
was disclosed in compliance with any federal or state regulation; or
becomes part of the contract under provisions of this article.
(e) A term which is unenforceable for failure to satisfy a requirement of
8571997]
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This section provides that a shrinkwrap license is deemed en-
forceable so long as a user manifests assent to its terms.93 Mani-
festation of assent has two components under Article 2B: (1) the
assenting party must have had an opportunity to review the
terms of the license,94 and (2) the assenting party must have en-
gaged in some affirmative conduct defined in the license as con-
stituting assent.95 Section 2B-308 limits general enforceability
by excluding terms which the licensor would know might cause
an ordinary person to refuse the contract, or which are in con-
travention of prior negotiations of the parties.9" Subsection (c) of
2B-308 works in the other direction by providing that if a term
which would otherwise be excluded is properly assented to, it be-
comes part of the contract. Subsection (d) operates as an ex-
emption from the exclusion provisions of subsection (b) for terms
which the licensor knows the licensee would refuse, but which
this article, such as a provision that expressly requires use of conspicuous
language or manifested assent to the term, is not part of the contract.
() In a mass-market transaction, unless otherwise agreed, an obligation or
limitation that was reasonably disclosed, on the product packaging or oth-
erwise, before payment of the license fee, or that was part of the product
description, becomes part of the contract without manifestation of assent
to a license or to a term containing the obligation or limitation.
(g) A mass-market license must be interpreted whenever reasonable as
treating in a similar manner all parties situated similarly without regard
to their knowledge or understanding of the terms of the record.
Id. § 2B-308.
A party can 'manifest assent' to a form or a term only if they previously had an
opportunity to review it and its terms. Assent to unknowable terms is not effective.
Beyond that, a party who had an opportunity to review the record and any specific
terms for which assent is required, manifests assent if it engages in affirmative con-
duct that the record conspicuously provides will constitute acceptance of the record or
of the particular term. Merely retaining the information or the record without objec-
tion is not a manifestation of assent. Also, a party's conduct does not manifest assent
unless the record was called to the party's attention before the party acts. See id at 26
(preface, lines 29-34).
94 See id. Section 2B-113 defines 'opportunity to review':
[the] opportunity to review a ... term [exists) if the ... term is made avail-
able in a manner to call it to the attention of the party or to enable the
electronic agent to record the term: (1) before the acquisition of a copy of
information; (2) before a transfer of rights; or (3) in the normal course of
initial use or preparation to use the information or to receive the transfer
of rights.
Id. 95 See id. § 2B-112 (defining 'manifestation of assent' as: "[aifter having an op-
portunity to review the ... term under Section 2B-113, it: (1) authenticates ... or en-
gages in other affirmative conduct ... and (2) had an opportunity to decline to
authenticate ... after having an opportunity to review").
96 See id. § 2B-308(b).
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would nevertheless be binding under existing intellectual prop-
erty law, for terms which are disclosed in compliance with state
and federal regulations, and for terms which become part of the
contract under other provisions of Article 2B.97 Subsection (e)
excludes those terms which are unenforceable for failure to
comply with any other part of Article 2B.98 Subsection (f) pro-
vides that if a term was reasonably disclosed prior to the pay-
ment of a licensing fee or was part of a product description it be-
comes part of the contract even if there was no manifestation of
assent.9 Finally, subsection (g) provides that a mass market li-
cense must be interpreted as treating similarly situated parties
in a similar manner without regard to their knowledge or under-
standing of the terms of the record."10
A. Manifestation of Assent and the Notice Requirement, Section
308(a)
As is evident from subsection (a), section 2B-308 seems to
adopt the ProCD rationale in enforcing shrinkwraps with one
significant distinction. By incorporating the "manifesting as-
sent" language, section 308 is characterizing the licensor as the
"master of the offer" just as the ProCD court did. This is so be-
cause under section 112 of Article 2B, a person manifests assent
if, after having an opportunity to review the licensing agreement,
they engage in conduct which is defined by the licensor as consti-
tuting assent. Thus, by allowing the licensor to define the ulti-
mate assenting conduct, Article 2B adopts the ProCD "master of
the offer" rationale.
The Article 2B approach differs and improves the ProCD
solution by incorporating a notice requirement as a prerequisite
to a manifestation of assent. The effect of this requirement is to
temper the power given to the vendor by requiring him to give
the end-user clear notice of the terms of the license. Since the
vendor knows that in order for the terms to be enforceable, the
end-user must be able to see them (and the vendor must assume
the end-user will see them), he is less likely to include patently
objectionable terms. The provisions offer further protections by
requiring otherwise objectionable terms to be conspicuously
07 See id. § 2B-308(d).
IS See id. § 2B-308(e).
See id. § 2B-308(f).
10 See id. § 2B-308(g).
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noted"' and separately assented to in accordance with the mani-
festation of assent requirements set forth in other sections, in
order to become part of the contract
B. The Refusal Terms, Section 308(b)
Subsection (b) explicitly states that actual knowledge or un-
derstanding of the terms is irrelevant so long as an opportunity
to review them existed. This is at odds with the general rule of
contract law that a misunderstanding of terms precludes a find-
ing of a manifestation of mutual assent."2 Typically, this situa-
tion arises when neither party had reason to know of the other's
misunderstanding or both parties shared a misunderstanding.'0 3
In the context of shrinkwrap licenses, there is no contact be-
tween the parties to permit a meeting of the minds. Thus, the
developer cannot know what an end-user does or does not under-
stand of the contract terms. It follows, therefore, that to avoid
contractual obligations, an end-user could claim a misunder-
standing of the terms and deny the existence of the contract for
lack of mutual assent. Allowing the purchaser such an out
would defeat the purpose of shrinkwrap licenses and bring the
sale of intangibles outside of the scope of licensing and back into
a sale-of-goods paradigm with the problematic implications of
10' See id. § 2B-102(a)(6). Section 2B-102(a)(6) provides that:
(6) "Conspicuous" means so displayed or presented that a reasonable indi-
vidual against whom or whose principal it operates ought to have noticed it
or, in the case of an electronic message intended to evoke a response with-
out the need for review by an individual, in a form that would enable a rea-
sonably configured electronic agent to take it into account or react to it
without review of the message by an individual. A term is conspicuous if it
is:
(A) a heading in all capitals (e.g. NON NEGOTIABLE BILL OF
LANDING) equal or greater in size to the surrounding text;
(B) language in the body or text of a record or display in larger or
other contrasting type or color than other language;
(C) a term prominently referenced in the body or text of an electronic
record or display that can be readily accessed from the record or dis-
play;
(D) language so positioned in a record or display that a party cannot
proceed without taking some additional action with respect to the
term or the reference thereto; or
(E) language readily distinguishable in another manner.
Id. § 2B-102(a)(6).
'o2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20 & 21 (1981).
103 "The basic principle governing material misunderstanding is ... no contract is
formed if neither party is at fault or if both parties are equally at fault." Id. § 20
cmt. d.
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the first sale doctrine.'0 Thus, in order to retain adequate pro-
tection of software developers, it is necessary to impose a rule of
opportunity to review the terms, as opposed to one requiring ac-
tual knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, a rule requir-
ing actual knowledge would invite abuse by end-users who may
seek to circumvent the substance of the agreement and be im-
measurably difficult to enforce effectively.0 5  The objective
"opportunity to review" standard is consequently the correct and
most equitable for shrinkwrap licenses.
Finally, the current subsection (b) effectively resolves two
problems present in prior versions of section 2B-308. In previous
versions, a term did not become part of the agreement if it was
not consistent with "customary industry practices and a reason-
able licensor should know would cause an ordinary or reasonable
licensee to refuse the license if the term were brought to their at-
tention."' Thus, if software developers acting through an indus-
trial association all agreed to put terms otherwise objectionable
into their license agreements-forgetting the possible collusion
implications-they would be able to circumvent the first re-
quirement. Such terms would fail the "not consistent with cus-
"'4 The purpose of the license is to define the rights retained by the vendor and
those given to the end-user. Without the license agreement, the transaction is in-
distinguishable from a sale of goods where the consumer hands over money to a
vendor, and takes home a product with full ownership rights and subject to the first
sale doctrine.
1O" For example, suppose a developer inserted a dialogue box containing a li-
cense agreement into his software. The software cannot be used without clicking on
a button which says, "I agree to the terms of the license." Embedded in the program
would be a register which checks whether or not the button was clicked. If so, the
program would execute; if not, the program would halt at the license agreement
dialogue box. Under the existing opportunity to review rule, the agreement is bind-
ing whether or not the user actually read it. By contrast under the actual knowledge
rule, the program may register that the license agreement was read, but the user
may still claim lack of understanding or that he did not read the terms but just
clicked through them. In order to make the contract binding, the developer would
have to somehow prove that the user actually did read the agreement. This can be
done in several ways: in house monitoring, witness testimony, or with as yet unde-
veloped technology. Notwithstanding practicality issues, the installation of a home
monitoring system installed to record what is done in front of a computer screen
raises significant right of privacy issues. Witnesses to events will typically be mem-
bers of the user's household or colleagues in employment. It is unlikely that either of
these groups would be willing to testify to enforce an agreement against the user.
Finally, the use of undeveloped technology poses equally undeveloped legal issues
which cannot be resolved at this time.
"a6 See U.C.C. § 2B-308(b)(1) (Tentative Draft Sept. 4, 1994) (visited Nov. 2,
1997) <http://www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/09040904_2b.html>.
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tomary industry practices" requirement and become part of the
agreement irrespective of whether the average licensee would
object.
The other problem solved by the current version of subsec-
tion (b) is the incorporation of language regarding terms which
there was no opportunity to review prior to the payment of the
contract fee. The inclusion of this language clarifies the meaning
of subsection (c), discussed below. Additionally, read in conjunc-
tion with subsection (c), the current version insures that a con-
sumer is not inconvenienced by having to return a product after
a substantial financial outlay because of a disagreeable term
which is only disclosed after payment of the licensing fee.
C. Objectionable Terms Must be Separately Assented to, Section
308(c)
Subsection (c) allows objectionable terms to become part of a
licensing agreement so long as they are separately assented to.
This provision is an effective balance between the rights of ven-
dors and end-users because it furthers the policy of freedom of
contract while maintaining a safeguard against potential abuse
by vendors by requiring clear disclosure and separate assent.
Additionally, the present version of section 308(c) no longer con-
tains a provision providing a "safe harbor" for terms that give no
less rights than under a first sale."7 The removed provision in-
tegrated terms, which would otherwise be refusal terms, so long
as they did not contravene the rights of licensees afforded under
the first sale doctrine.
Section 2B-308(c) would insure that the expectations of the
consumer are not frustrated by an objectionable term, and that
the consumer is not burdened with having to remedy a problem
that the vendor is in the best position to avoid by packaging the
product in a way that conspicuously notes the term in question
107 The September 4, 1996 draft of section 2B-308(c) provided:
A term excluded under subsection (b) becomes part of the contract if. (1)
the term creates rights for or restrictions on the licensee which give the li-
censee no fewer rights than would be given to a purchaser at a first sale
under federal intellectual property law, or (2) the licensee manifests assent
to the term.
U.C.C. § 2B-308(c) (Tentative Draft Sept. 4, 1996). The reasons cited for the removal
of the "Safe Harbor" provision are that it was confusing, and that terms which are
otherwise consistent with first sale doctrine, see supra note 104, may nonetheless be
surprising terms requiring separate assent. See U.C.C. § 2B-308 Reporter's Notes,
at n.2 (Tentative Draft Sept. 4, 1996).
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and allows for separate assent. It also protects the interests of
vendors and manufacturers by allowing them to include terms
which may be objectionable under subsection (b) so long as the
consumer is given adequate notice of such terms, and manifests
assent to them.
D. Federal & State Intellectual Property Law, Section 308(d)
Section 308(d) creates an exception to the general exclusion
of refusal terms under subsection (b) for terms which simply re-
state limitations on the licensee's use of the information which
already exist under intellectual property law. Thus, under sub-
section (d), a provision of a license which prohibits the copying of
the information for commercial use by the licensee would become
part of the contract, even if the provision were to be considered a
"refusal term," since this limitation is akin to the one imposed by
federal copyright law. Put another way, should a term of the
contract that restates or modifies the exclusive rights already
granted under patent or copyright laws be excluded under sec-
tion 2B-308(b)(1), the otherwise excluded term would neverthe-
less become part of the contract under 2B-308(d)(1). 10 Hence,
subsection (d) succeeds in insulating existing federal protection
from poorly drafted terms.
Unfortunately, as currently drafted, the provision's open-
ended language fails to disclose that some terms may be pre-
empted."9 By promoting wholesale adoption of terms without
outlining the scope of terms that fall under the federal copyright
scheme, the proposed revision encourages interference with the
federal scheme.
Instead, section 2B-308(d) should state that only certain
subject matter"0 may be the object of limited use terms in an ad-
hesion contract."' Terms limiting use would only be valid if the
'*' According to the reporter's notes, this section is to "ensure that the process
does not prejudice enforcement of terms that correspond to copyright or patent
rights." Id.
' In an attempt to bring shrinkwrap licenses into conformity with federal intel-
lectual property law, section 2-203 provides that a term becomes part of the contract
where it "transfers rights or creates restrictions on the behavior of the licensee
which would give the licensee no fewer rights than would be given to a purchaser at
a first sale under federal intellectual property law." U.C.C. § 2-203(c)(1).
110 For instance, subject matter uncopyrightable or subject matter copyrightable
but not falling within the public domain. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying
text.
. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (illustrating scope of current ver-
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subject matter is copyrighted otherwise, the term must be explic-
itly assented to at purchase and thereby fall within the purview
of state law. Consequently, those uncopyrightable elements such
as underlying ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries which remain
within the public domain once disclosed may not be protected
under hidden terms of a shrinkwrap."' Carefully drafted provi-
sions could satisfy the broader public policy of encouraging inno-
vation, without the chilling effects that restrictive terms of an
adhesion contract could have. Consequently, properly designed
shrinkwrap licenses could still serve a useful purpose without in-
terfering with the federal scheme.
Subsections (d)(2) and (3) also preclude terms disclosed in
compliance with state or federal regulations and terms which be-
come part of the contract under another provision of Article 2B
from being refusal terms.' These exceptions serve to protect the
use of conspicuous terms by manufacturers and vendors."4 Ab-
sent these enumerated exceptions, it may be argued that a rea-
sonably disclosed disclaimer or limitation on damages would be a
refusal term and should not come within a contract. The exclu-
sion of such limitations could lead to potentially cataclysmic li-
ability for manufacturers and vendors operating in the mass
market. Consequently, the provisions of (d)(2) and (3) are neces-
sary to successfully insulate manufacturers from far reaching li-
ability.
E. Compliance With Other Provisions of Article 2B as a
Condition of Incorporation, Section 308(e)
Subsection (e) of section 308 serves to exclude any term
which fails to satisfy any other provision of Article 2B, such as a
provision requiring use of conspicuous language or assent to a
term." 5 This subsection serves an important purpose by ex-
pressly requiring compliance with other parts of Article 2B in
order for a term to be part of a contract. Without this provision,
a licensor may look only to section 2B-308 to define the scope of
sion of U.C.C. § 2-308(f)).
112 See infra note 116 and accompanying text (describing how U.C.C. § 2B-308(f)
as currently drafted promotes terms that may restate or modify rights protected by
copyright).
See id. § 2B-308(d).
114 See U.C.C. § 2B-308(d) Reporter's Notes, at n.10 (May 5, 1997 draft).
1 See id. § 2B-308(e).
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enforceable terms without reference to other parts of Article 2B,
such as definition provisions and notice requirements. This
would confound the fundamental purpose of section 2B-308,
which is to give reasonable notice to the licensee. The provision
is therefore necessary for preservation of an equitable balance
between the interests of the parties to the transaction.
F. Terms Reasonably Disclosed Prior to Payment Become Part
of the Contract, Section 308(f)
This subsection provides that if a term or product descrip-
tion was reasonably disclosed to the consumer on the product
packaging or otherwise prior to the consumer's payment of the
license fee, such term becomes part of the contract. 116 The most
significant aspect of this provision is what it neglects to men-
tion-namely, the manifestation of assent. Thus, under subsec-
tion (f), terms which are disclosed prior to the payment of a li-
cense fee do not require assent to become part of the contract.
This seems to conflict with the provisions of subsection (a) which
require that there be a manifestation of assent in order for a
term to be included in a contract. There are several rationales
which explain why subsection (f) does not occupy the field of sub-
section (a).
It can be said that the purchasing of the information consti-
tutes assent to the terms reasonably disclosed on the packaging.
Under this paradigm, the opportunity to review is present in the
consumer's ability to examine the packaging of the product. The
consumer manifests assent to the terms when he lays down his
money.
A problem with this approach, however, is that it ignores the
characterization of the licensor as "master of the offer." Under
the "master of the offer" concept the licensor must define the
conduct which constitutes a manifestation of assent. Thus, ab-
sent reasonably disclosed language stating that the purchase of
the product manifests assent to the limitations and obligations
contained on the packaging of the software, an argument can be
made that the consumer did not actually assent to the terms but
rather ignored them and purchased the item in spite of the
terms.
A stronger means of reconciling subsections (a) and (f) may
16 See id. § 2B-308(f).
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be to view them as applying to entirely different circumstances.
Subsection (a) may be said to contemplate situations where the
information or software is already in the possession of the con-
sumer, but the terms and limitations were not disclosed to the
consumer at time of purchase. In such circumstances it is ra-
tional to require the manufacturer to obtain the assent of the
consumer before giving legal force to the terms of the manufac-
turer's license since the purchaser did not have the opportunity
to review the terms before purchasing the item.
By contrast, subsection (f) deals with situations where the
terms of a license are disclosed prior to the tender of payment by
the consumer. Thus, the consumer buys with adequate oppor-
tunity to review the terms, and is at the very least on notice of
the potential liability which may arise if he chooses to violate
them. It is submitted that it is less important for a manufac-
turer to obtain separate assent to the terms of his license if such
license is disclosed on the packaging and the consumer is free to
make a choice about whether or not to purchase the item and be
bound by the terms of its license.
G. Interpretation of Terms of Mass Market Licenses, Section
308(g)
Subsection (g) provides that "a mass market license must be
interpreted whenever reasonable as treating in a similar manner
all parties situated similarly without regard to their knowledge
or understanding of the terms of the record." 7
The current language of this subsection replaces the lan-
guage of former drafts which placed the burden of proving
"customary industry practices" on the licensor."' The elimina-
tion of the customary industry practices standard with respect to
refusal terms, as discussed above, makes the question of who has
the burden of proving industry practices moot. Instead, the cur-
rent language provides a guideline for interpretation of standard
forms.
III. SHRINKWRAPS UNDER ARTICLE 2B: A (MOSTLY) EFFECTIVE
FRAMEWORK
Shrinkwrap licenses are an important means for the soft-
117 Id. § 2B-308(g).
118 See U.C.C. § 2B-308(e) (Tentative Draft Sept. 4, 1996).
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ware industry to effectively transact business in the mass-
market where individual negotiation of licenses is impracticable.
Article 2B closes some of the holes left open by the ProCD deci-
sion and provides much needed clarity and certainty in this area.
It does so by introducing a sound notice requirement which de-
mands an opportunity to review and some affirmative conduct
manifesting assent. Additionally, it makes the notice require-
ment more stringent for unusual terms by requiring separate as-
sent to such terms.
An important aspect of the Article 2B guidelines is an equi-
table balancing of interests among parties. Article 2B, in gen-
eral, provides some guidelines relating to unconscionability." 9
The key balance to be struck is between contractual rights and
notice. 2 ' Generally Article 2B provides that warranty disclaim-
ers on mass market software are not unconscionable.' 2' Fur-
thermore, Article 2B mandates electronic self-help'2 in certain
limited circumstances." The rules set forth by Article 2B are
generally based on analogous provisions in Article 2 of the
U.C.C. This "digital overlay" to existing contract law makes an
effective foundation for the growth of the law in the electronic
arena. Through this system, courts can address new questions of
law and technology while basing their reasoning on well-settled
principles of commercial law.
The scope of Article 2B, however, appears overly broad. This
overbreadth may induce courts to fail to recognize that certain
terms may seek copyright protection and therefore should be
preempted. The one danger of the ProCD holding and the pro-
posed U.C.C. amendments is that general acceptance of shrink-
wrap licenses will promote wholesale protection in an industry
where none is warranted. Copyright, patent, and trade secret
laws and their associated jurisprudence are already available to
offer significant legal protection for software.' The broad cover-
age of the U.C.C. could be misinterpreted by courts which fail to
119 For example, U.C.C. §§ 2B-320 and 2B-629 allow for the use of electronic
monitoring and restriction devices which regulate use of the software. Also, Article
2B follows the tradition of U.S. contract law allowing the disclaimer of warranties.
See U.C.C. art. 2B, at 30 (Official Proposed Draft 1996) (Preface).
121 See id. at 331. 19.
121 See id. at 30 1. 26.
'22 See id. §§ 2B-320 & 2B-629. As long as there is notice to parties, use of elec-
tronic restriction, i.e. viruses, monitoring programs is allowed.
' See id.
124 In addition, the nature of the technology provides its own form of protection.
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examine whether the specific terms, when enforced in the aggre-
gate, conflict with the federal scheme and should be preempted.
Complete protection is unwarranted as well as harmful to
the public good. Due to the nature of software, the balance of
rights is already tipped in favor of software manufacturers and
additional protection would further exaggerate this imbalance.1"
The ideas inherent in the software are hidden from the consumer
in the form of low-level computer language which is only acces-
sible through "reverse engineering" or "decompiling." The con-
sumer's right to view the ideas contained in the software is made
even more tenuous by courts' disagreement over the permissibil-
ity of reverse engineering under "fair use."12 Consequently, the
disclosure of ideas to the public in exchange for granting copy-
right monopoly to manufacturers is minimal and access to the
public domain elements of the software severely curtailed.'27 In-
deed, the wide use of these terms in mass-market licenses bor-
ders upon prohibited copyright misuse by attempting to expand
the copyright holders' monopoly, and therefore should not be en-
125 Software, by its nature, creates a unique situation in which the manufactur-
ers are granted copyright protection but the public receives little benefit in ex-
change and retains few protected rights. Even normal use of the software may im-
plicate copyright prohibitions and put consumers at risk. For example, use of the
program requires a copy to be made in some form through the computer's memory.
Such normal use without an additional license agreement has been held to be ac-
tionable. Even the right to adapt software to a consumer's particular use is ques-
tioned. See Marvin N. Bean & Richard J. Superfine, Section 117 - The Right to
Adapt Into the Fourth Generation and the Source Code Generator's Dilemma, 12 J.
MARSHALL COMPUTER & INFO. 537 (1994). The rights that consumers retain under
the federal scheme are so limited that they seem only to exist where explicitly pro-
tected by the statutory exemptions of section 117, and through judicial activism.
126 See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Vault Corp.
v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
127 Although the copyright laws permit a near monopoly, through the protections
inherent in the software industry, the retained rights and the benefits accrued to
the public theoretically counterbalance the monopoly's harmful effects. However,
the continued existence of monopoly power and its effect on market prices, despite
the limited term of copyright protection, may be evidence that the protections gar-
nered by the software industry are too strong. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1274-79
("The strength of the 'appropriate regime' established by the intellectual property
laws in an industry depends on the extent to which free riding is constrained by fed-
eral law."); see also Thomas M. Jorde & David Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and
Antitrust: Balancing Competition and Cooperation, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (1989).
Some commentators have suggested a shorter term of protection for software pat-
ents. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1131 (1986).
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couraged.128
Despite the public interest served by preventing state pro-
tection of public domain information, the ProCD court perceived
the necessity of protecting software databases. While it is rea-
sonable to protect these compilations by express contract so as
not to deter such obviously useful projects, the ProCD court and
Article 2B amendments fail to see how broad acceptance of such
terms tend to create rights akin to copyright. In order to protect
copyrightable subject matter that does not rise to the requisite
level of creativity, an area expressly preempted by Congress, the
appropriate remedy lies not with the courts but with the legisla-
ture.
CONCLUSION
The Article 2B amendments to the U.C.C. strike a reason-
able balance among the conflicting interests with respect to
shrinkwrap licenses. However, care should be taken to encour-
age conspicuous disclosure of non-standard terms as well as to
discourage use of terms which could interfere with the Federal
scheme when used in the shrinkwrap context.
Thomas Finkelstein and Douglas C. Wyatt
128 Copyright in conjunction with adhesion contracts seems to be "attempting to
use its copyright to obtain a patent-like monopoly over unpatented [goods]." DSC
Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996). Such copyright
misuse raises antitrust issues that are beyond the scope of this paper.
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